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ABSTRACT

The Changing Dynamics of Coattails in
Senate Elections
by
Sheila Dubron Lambert
Dr. David Damore, Examination Committee Chair
Assistant Professor of Political Science
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

The prevailing theoretical approach in political science has been to
analyze presidential coattails from a top down perspective focusing on the
effect that presidential elections have on congressional outcomes.
Presidential coattail research has been limited in scope to coattails as a
one-way causation often examining variables in isolation, rarely
accounting for the complex nature of elections and competing forces that
influence elections across various levels of campaigns. This research
seeks to present a more realistic view of campaign processes by
assessing the spillover effects that campaign activity for one race may
have on other races occurring simultaneously. Specifically, this thesis
considers the factors that shape the context in which presidential and
senatorial campaigns are occurring. This thesis builds upon prior

III

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

research to offer a state-level analysis of Senate elections and analyze the
upward impact Senate elections may have on the vote for President.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
The 2004 Florida election was the scene of a very competitive open seat
Senate race between Mel Martinez (R) and Betty Castor (D), which resulted in a
narrow victory of 50% for Martinez. The Florida presidential election was just as
close with George Bush, the Republican candidate for president, receiving 52%
of the vote and John Kerry, the Democrat received 47% of the vote. In 1996, the
Florida presidential vote went to the Democratic presidential candidate, while the
2000 presidential vote was virtually a tie, with each candidate receiving 48.8
percent of the vote. The 2004 campaign effects should have been a wash in
terms of support for the presidential candidate, but the competitive relationship
between the vote for president and Senate in Florida may have helped the
incumbent presidential candidate win the state.
The 2004 election Nevada election proved somewhat less dramatic. Bush
received 50% of the Nevada presidential vote, while Kerry received 48% of the
vote. This vote was in stark contrast to the votes in the Nevada Senate election.
The Democrat Senator, Harry Reid, received 61% of the vote, while the
Republican challenger, Richard Ziser, received only 35% of the vote. Research
suggested that the close marginality for Senator Reid's 1998 Senate race, with a
difference of less than one percent, would create the backdrop for a quality
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challenger to emerge. Richard Ziser, however, with no previous political
experience was not a quality challenger and was unable to mount a viable
financial challenge to match the financial reserves of Senator Reid.
The Nevada election proved significant for other reasons. Nevada is
considered a swing state, and in 2004 was kept in the undecided column for
much of the election. Political pundits suggested that policy factors such as the
war in Iraq or local issues such as the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste depository
would help the Kerry/Edwards ticket. However, there were other considerations
that influenced the vote in Nevada to a greater degree. Nevada had one of the
lowest unemployment rates, one of the fastest growing populations and strong
support for the war in Iraq. These factors proved to be more important in
deciding the election. Presidential ratings and economic factors set the backdrop
for presidential campaigns to play a big role by effecting whether or not quality
candidates emerge. While all the indicators suggested that Reid would face a
strong competitive challenger from the incumbent president’s party, he did not.
Thus, because the Senate race was not competitive it had no effect on the
presidential race as evidenced by the similar presidential vote difference in 2000
and 2004.’
Political science research has long sought to explain or predict election
results. It is the vote choice on Election Day that defines the United States
political system. Political scholars have structured this explanation by specifying
which campaign variables have the biggest effect or any effect at all. Those

^ George Bush received 50% of Nevada’s presidential vote in 2000 and 50.7% of Nevada’s
presidential vote in 2004.
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variables have included campaign fundraising, media, and prior political
experience to name just a few. Research has tended to examine these factors in
isolation, rarely accounting for the complex nature of elections and the competing
forces that influence elections across various levels of campaigns occurring
simultaneously.
The primary contention of this thesis is that campaign activity at one level
affects the campaign dynamics at other levels. This study differs from other
research by attempting to untangle this process by analyzing the effect that
campaign activity and the competitiveness of Senate elections exert on state
level outcomes. More specifically, the research question posited here is under
what conditions will Senate campaigns affect the statewide presidential vote?
Political science research typically explains elections from a top-down
approach, focusing on the result that presidential elections have on
congressional outcomes. These studies do not explain the potential power that
lower level races have on the vote for President. Specifically, this study will build
upon prior research to analyze under what conditions Senate elections effect the
vote for President. As such, this research seeks to present a more realistic view
of campaign processes by assessing the spillover effects that campaign activity
for one race may have on other races occurring contemporaneously. That is,
whereas prior research tends to consider races occurring at different levels (e.g.,
local, state, or national) as separate phenomenon, this effort untangles the
effects that campaign activity targeted at one level (e.g., campaigns for the
United States Senate) may have on campaigns occurring simultaneously (e.g.,
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the presidential elections). The remainder of the thesis is organized as outlined
below.
Chapter two presents an evaluation of current and past research on
presidential and Senate campaigns, as well as a review of larger theories of
campaigns and elections. Specifically, the chapter reviews prior work examining
presidential elections, presidential coattail theories, and the dynamics of Senate
and House elections. Additionally, chapter two includes a discussion of previous
campaign research, which focuses on whether campaign matters as well as
national and state level variables that effect elections.
The thesis's theory and hypotheses are presented in chapter three.
Specifically, the theory assesses the factors that affect challenger quality and
competitiveness, as well as national and local factors that shape the context in
which presidential and senatorial campaigns are occurring. To assess the
influence of macro level variables, the thesis modifies Holbrook’s (1991) model of
state level presidential voting. By modifying Holbrook’s model and incorporating
variables such as presidential campaign activity, this thesis hopes to determine
the level of support a presidential candidate may receive from a Senate election
on a state-by-state basis. These modifications will allow this thesis to untangle
and analyze the various components of national and state specific factors
effecting elections. The theory also builds on the work of Jacobsen (2000) by
examining how national conditions affect the emergence of observable measures
of campaign competitiveness.
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The research design, including data and measurement, are discussed in
chapter four. Specifically, to test the hypotheses suggested in chapter three, data
for all Senate elections occurring between 1988 and 2000 were collected. This
chapter also explains the selection of regression analysis and the importance of
using causal modeling to assess processes that unfold over time. The chapter
also includes detailed discussion of the variables used in the subsequent
analysis. Chapter five presents the results of the analysis and highlights the key
findings that suggest Senate elections do affect the vote for president.
Chapter six discusses the findings and implications of this effort.
Specifically, this study adds to the research by further untangling the role of
competitiveness and its influence on presidential elections. In doing so, the
thesis presents an alternative view for conceptualizing and understanding the
fluidity and multi-level nature of campaign effects.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
The general theoretical approach in political science has been to analyze
the presidential coattail effect as a one-way causal process flowing from
presidential elections to congressional races and to develop predictive measures
from those models to determine how many seats a political party may gain or
lose in Congress based upon the strength of its presidential candidate.
Additional research has sought to analyze the surge and decline theory in
concert with presidential coattails as a basis for understanding the dynamics of
congressional midterm elections. There is extensive literature available on
House elections and their relationship to presidential coattails, but the
relationship between Senate elections and presidential coattails is limited. This
study will focus on the relationship between Senate campaigns and the vote for
president. More to the point, in contrast with prior research, this effort will
analyze under what conditions Senate elections are able to effect the state level
vote for president; a process akin to the notion of reverse coattails.
Reviewing the literature on presidential elections suggests that these
studies were developed on the premise that national conditions such as the
popularity of the president and the state of the national economy can have a
direct affect on House elections. This review will look at the various presidential
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models including Rosenstone (1983), Campbell (1986) and Holbrook’s (1991)
work. Next, will be an examination of the research on presidential coattails. It is
important to consider all the research on presidential coattails to ensure proper
accounting for the variety of possible causal factors in the data. Additionally, this
review is important to gain an understanding of what research has been
completed to be able to contribute to the campaign literature.
From there, this chapter moves to a discussion of congressional election
studies. Reviewing the research on House and Senate elections will provide the
necessary background to answer the question -under what conditions do Senate
elections affect presidential elections? Jacobsen (2000) suggests that the key to
understanding coattails is to understand the interactions between individual
candidates, such as candidate emergence, national conditions and campaign
activity. This research builds on Jacobsen’s assumptions.
Finally, the underlying theme throughout this review and the thesis more
generally is the “do campaigns matter” literature. This literature includes
Campbell (2000), who suggests that national macro level indicators such as
presidential popularity and the economy are more important than campaigns, to
other researchers such as Holbrook who suggests that “it is clear that campaign
effects play a key role in determining election outcomes” (1996, 148). This
thesis attempts to evaluate election studies from the perspective that campaigns
matter and have clear effects when elections are competitive. One additional
area of discussion will consider the various conditions that create competitive
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campaigns and the interactive effects between elections occurring at the same
time.

Presidential Studies
Rosenstone’s model (1983) was developed to forecast the presidential
vote on a state-by-state basis. His model utilized a variety of factors effecting
presidential elections. Some of the model’s factors included subjective measures
such as social and racial issues. Holbrook’s (1991 ) research builds upon
Rosenstone’s work and provides a model with more objective measures to
evaluate a variety of conditions effecting presidential elections on a state-by-state
basis. Specifically, Holbrook demonstrates that both state and national level
factors accounted for variation in state level voting the 1976, 1980, and 1984
presidential elections. The 1991 model is significant because it incorporated
objective measures at the state-level for national influences as well as campaign
variables. As outlined below, this thesis incorporates Holbrook’s work.
In contrast to Holbrook’s work, Campbell’s work questions the underlying
assumptions that campaigns matter. Specifically, Campbell (1992) suggests that
both Rosenstone’s and Holbrook’s models are incomplete. Utilizing a variety of
factors in Rosenstone’s and Holbrook’s models, Campbell attempts to develop a
predictive model to forecast the presidential vote in each state. The most
significant difference in Campbell’s model is his use of trial heat polls instead of
measures of campaign activity. Specifically, Campbell and Garand (2000)
contend that it is possible to accurately predict presidential elections without
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campaign variables. Campbell and Garand base their assumptions on campaign
activities, which they term “predictable.” From the 2000 study, an example of a
predictable campaign measure would be partisanship. These assumptions,
however, work well only with non-competitive campaigns and with clearly defined
macro variables such as the status of the economy. According to their research,
campaigns do not have an effect on elections because the activity of each
campaign counteracts the other and very few votes are in play, particularly in
non-competitive campaigns. In addition, this research suggests that partisanship
is a constant factor and therefore, makes voter choice predictable. Campbell and
Garand do not consider the continual decline in partisanship, the impact of
independent voters, or the increasing influence of swing voters, which affects
state vote choice.^
In addition, Cambpell’s (1986) model underestimates economic factors
and ideology, both of which effect swing voters. Each state has its own measure
of political ideology, which is not necessarily reflected in partisanship registration
(Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1986). It is important to evaluate each election on
a state-by-state basis because the political climate in each state is distinctly
different. If the political ideology of a presidential candidate is not matched with a
state, it will prove more challenging, if not impossible, to win that state.
Holbrook’s (1991) model utilized specific independent variables to demonstrate
the difference in the presidential vote on a state-by-state basis. Those factors
not only include party strength and state ideology, but also include variables for

^ Bartels (2000) suggests there is not a decline in partisanship. This is discussed in more detail
below.
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region, jobs, income, and whether or not it was the home state of the presidential
or vice presidential party nominees. In addition, national macro level conditions
such as the economy and presidential popularity were included. These variables
combined with campaign intensity can shift the election dynamics in any state.
While some may argue presidential campaigns have a limited impact on
state level voting, this opinion is not shared by all researchers. Shaw considered
presidential campaign activity by analyzing state visits and television advertising
for 1988, 1992, and 1996 (1999a). Shaw’s analysis considered media buys and
presidential visits from Labor Day to Election Day. Shaw’s studies found
“presidential campaigning influences statewide support for candidates” (1999a,
358). Shaw also explained how some states never see a presidential candidate,
while other states see them repeatedly, suggesting strategic allocations of
campaign resources such as money and visits. That is, presidential candidates
may visit battleground states more often compared to less competitive states. In
addition to national and state forces, the work of Shaw suggests that presidential
campaigning affects non-decided voters.
In summary, there are two schools of thought that exist regarding the role
and importance of campaigns. The first suggests that macro level factors
determine election campaigns. The second school of thought maintains macro
level factors are important, but more significantly is the effect they have on
candidate emergence. These macro level factors set up the backdrop for
campaigns to matter.

10
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Surge and Decline
As mentioned above, the primary approach to studying the effect that
campaign activity at one level exerts on other campaigns has been top-down.
Campbell (1987) evaluated the surge and decline theory in presidential elections,
and offered an explanation as to why there are differences in voter turnout
between presidential and midterm elections. Campbell explained a surge in
turnout among partisans of the advantaged party and a surge in support for the
advantaged party among independent voters. Angus Campbell’s (1960) work
was used as the blueprint for Campbell’s later evaluation. Similar to the original
theory. Campbell focuses on the short-term forces in presidential elections. The
primary difference in the revised theory is the vote choice based on a “surge” of
information in presidential elections resulting in a higher turnout of independent
voters. This surge is suggested to have an impact on turnout rates and voter
choice of partisans and independent voters alike. This surge of information can
be related to campaign activity through the dramatic increase in information
disseminated by political parties or the mobilization of partisan voters and
undecided voters.
Kritzer and Eubank (1979) considered surge and decline as one possible
explanation for the lack of presidential coattails. This explanation would be
described in terms of the increase and changing characteristics of independent
voters. Those characteristics include citizens with diminished party loyalty based
on either economic or moral issues; both of which may contribute to an increase
in independent voters. The changing characteristics of voters can be directly

11
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linked to a diminished association with political party affiliation as evidenced by
split ticket voting, which gives rise to a greater number of independents.
Campbell asserts that voters have three possible choices in any election.
First, an inveterate voter can make the choice to reinforce his or her vote for a
favored party candidate. An inveterate voter is a citizen who regularly turns out
for elections and supports his or her respective political party without fail. An
inveterate voter would be defined as an individual with deep rooted and firmly
established beliefs and connections to his or her political party. This typically
manifests itself in terms of partisan or straight ticket voting. Second, voters of the
disadvantaged party can choose to support a candidate whom they do not
believe in or whom they do not believe can win or for voting for the favored
candidate. Lastly, they could choose not to vote. According to Campbell,
independent voters may be more easily swayed because they are not closely
aligned with any one party.

Presidential Coattails
Although there are mixed reviews on the power of presidential coattails,
the most accepted theory in political science is presidential coattails have been
diminishing (Jacobsen, 2000; Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983; Ferejohn and Calvert,
1984; Mondak, 1990). For instance, the 1996 Democratic presidential victory of
Bill Clinton should have benefited the Democrats in Congress, but it is the
Republicans that gained two seats in the Senate.^ Similarly, in the 1998 midterm

^ The 1996 U.S. Senate election had 13 open seats; eight seats vacated by Democrats, with
Republican victories in three of elections, plus the Republicans held on to their own, except one.

12
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election, Clinton gained seats in the House when it was predicted the Democrats
would lose seats; a similar scenario unfolded in 2002. There have been several
explanations for the reduction in presidential coattails including an increase in
independent voters and a decrease in partisan identification. Both of these are
discussed below.
The definition of presidential coattails utilized for this study, taken from
Jacobsen (2001, 146), “reflects the notion that successful candidates at the top
of the ticket - on national elections, the winning presidential candidate - pull
some of their party’s candidates into office along with them riding, as they were,
on their coattails.” In earlier studies, coattails were more pronounced if the
presidential candidate had a high approval rating (Mondak, 1990) or won by a
large margin (Kaplowtiz, 1971). There is a vast amount of political science
research that discusses presidential coattails and whether or not coattails are
alive and well (e.g.. Born, 1984; Campbell, 1986; Campbell and Sumners, 1990);
if presidential coattails are declining (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983; Ferejohn and
Calvert, 1984; Tuckel and Tejera, 1983); or if coattails are non-existent in a
particular election (Mondak, 1990).
The coattail research above has mainly focused on the strength of
presidential coattails and their impact on House elections as a one-way
causation. There have been a variety of methods utilized to assess and predict
presidential coattails. These approaches have included individual level data from
national surveys (Jacobsen 1976; Calvert and Ferejohn 1983), aggregate data at
the congressional level (Born, 1984) and at the national level (Ferejohn and

13
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Calvert 1984, Campbell 1986), and straight aggregate voting data (Kaplowtiz
1971). However, the current research models do not have measures to account
for the spillover effects from the various campaigns and consider how they
influence vote choice.
Researchers have discussed the various influences coattails have on
congressional elections. By evaluating coattails at the national level using a
direct two-equation model, Calvert and Ferejohn (1983) suggest that presidential
coattails have declined, but not at levels suggested by other research. Ferejohn
and Calvert (1984) and Tuckel and Tejera (1983) offer a historical perspective of
the presidential coattail effect and explain what they suggest is a downward trend
or lessened impact of presidential coattails on House elections. The overall
conclusion of these studies is the extent of coattail voting has declined steadily
consistent with the decline in party identification over the past decades.
Contrary to the research that suggests a decline in party identification,
Bartels (2000) disagrees with mainstream research that party identification has
been declining. Bartels suggests that partisan voting has stabilized in the 1990s
and continues to increase in importance. This research posits one possible
hypothesis “that increasing partisanship in the electorate represents a response
at the mass level to increasing partisanship at the elite level” (44). This
contention would provide support for presidential coattail proponents.
Contrary to the mainstream opinions in political science today suggesting
a downward trend in presidential coattails, Born (1984) and Campbell (1986)
submit the presidential vote has lost little of its ability to expand House election

14
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margins. They argue that support for claims of a weakened impact on
presidential coattails is based on inadequate evidence. Campbell and Born both
evaluated the presidential vote and suggest that the presidential vote continues
to have a strong and significant effect on congressional seat change. They
further suggest that scholars have relied on faulty measurement strategies and
should apply more appropriate measures to evaluate the research. One example
is in regards to survey-based research. Born suggests that survey data are best
served to identify individual motives, but “existing data are inadequate to
disentangle the complex web of causality which can connect the two voting
decisions” (61 ).
Presidential coattails have been analyzed strictly as a top-down
phenomena with just a slight mention of a reverse coattail possibility in one
Senate election study by Campbell and Sumners (1990). Campbell and Sumners
attempted to illustrate how a political party’s presidential vote in the states
remained positively related to its’ Senate vote. This work investigated to what
extent presidential coattails are responsible for this association. Campbell and
Sumners included all Senate elections in the study, even those that were not
considered competitive. The analysis suggests that there are not any reverse
coattails, but this finding does not systematically analyze this process, which is
the intent of this effort.

15
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National Conditions and Campaign Effects
An implicit tension in the above literature is the debate regarding the role
and importance of campaign processes for affecting election outcomes. There is
disagreement among authors as to whether campaigns matter (e.g., Kahn and
Kenney, 1999; Shaw, 1999b; Westlye, 1983; Holbrook, 1994) or whether they
have less of an impact (Campbell, 2000; Campbell and Gerand, 2000). There is
some debate as to how much campaigns matter and if national factors are the
predicting measures. Specifically, some argue campaigns have small, direct
effects and instead, are determined largely by national forces (Jacobsen, 2000).
In contrast, the work of Shaw (1999a) and Holbrook (1994) attempts to bridge the
gap in our understanding of the interaction between national forces and
campaign processes by arguing campaigns do matter. While this debate is far
from settled, others argue that in addition to affecting presidential voting, national
forces also indirectly influence what occurs in congressional elections
(Abramowitz, 1988; Abramowitz and Segal, 1986).
Most notably, Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson (1995) suggest that the
public mood, an aggregated measure of the public’s domestic policy preferences
create the context in which elections occur. Along these same lines, national
conditions such as presidential popularity and the economy create the
environment for campaigns to matter. According to Jacobsen and Kernell (1981),
these national level forces have an indirect effect on candidate recruitment. That
is, the economy and the presidential popularity thermometer ratings set up the
conditions for quality candidates to emerge. If the national economy was

16
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determined to be in a recession, quality ctiallengers from the presidential
challenger party would be expected to emerge. Similarly, if the economy had
strong positive indicators, quality challengers from the presidential incumbent
party would be expected to emerge.
In order to analyze the impact of presidential campaign effects on the
state level vote, Shaw (1999a) utilized data on television purchases and
presidential candidate appearances. Shaw’s study concluded that candidate
activities, in each respective state, were directly and positively related to each
candidate’s vote. Furthermore, while national factors such as the economy play
a role in congressional and presidential election outcomes, campaign activities
are important and make a difference. Other research by Kahn and Kenney,
1999; Westlye, 1991; Shaw, 1999b; Holbrook 1991, 1994; and Abramowtiz,
1984, all concluded campaigns do make a difference.
There is some discrepancy between the various authors as to what
should be considered a campaign event and what comprises national factors.
Holbrook (1994) puts forth a model for candidate support that incorporates
campaign variables and national conditions. Holbrook’s (1994) study focused on
specific campaign and national factors. He reviewed a variety of national events
that had a significant impact on public opinion including campaign momentum,
debates, and political conventions. National conventions were identified by
researchers as the most influential campaign event for both Democratic and
Republican candidates (Holbrook, 1994; Shaw 1999b), while the Democratic and

17
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Republican national committees consider this as simply the kick-off for the
presidential campaign.

Senate Studies
In 1913, the Seventeenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provided for the direct election of senators."^ Since this time, Senate elections
have evolved into highly competitive and complex campaigns. Senate races are
typically viewed as more competitive than House races because they are not
affected by redistricting and because of the longer election terms. Senate terms
are six years and staggered with one-third of the Senate seats contested every
two years. Even though it is the Senate that is perceived as the powerhouse of
Congress, more attention and research has focused on House elections. This is
mainly attributed to the sheer number of House elections every two years, which
provides more data to develop and test explanatory and predictive models.
At the same time. Senate campaigns have greater visibility than House
campaigns (Stewart, 1989) and, as suggested before, are generally more
competitive since they attract more well-financed and experienced challengers.
There have been several studies that analyzed various characteristics of Senate
elections, including challenger quality and competitiveness. Stewart (1989)
focused on predicting quality challengers by considering marginality and
campaign expenditures. Westlye (1983) analyzed the competitive nature of

Prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, United States Senators were appointed by their
respective state legislature.
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senatorial seats in respect to resources and explored constituency-based
explanations.
Abramowitz and Segal (1992) focused on Senate elections and attempted
to demonstrate seat changes through patterns associated with national
conditions. Their work suggests that the prior distribution of Senate seats along
with the economic conditions and the popularity of the incumbent president have
distinct effects on the vote. Abramowitz (1988) builds upon this research and
uses the individual Senate contest as the unit of analysis to estimate the relative
influence of variables effecting Senate elections including political characteristics
of states, characteristics of candidates, and national political conditions.
Abramowitz attempts to build a comprehensive model of Senate election
outcomes, and includes variables that continue to be at the center of the electoral
literature such as candidate spending, coattails, challenger quality, and
partisanship. This work suggests that Senate elections are influenced by
campaigns and national conditions.
Additional studies have attempted to explain how candidate characteristics
or policy decisions affect the vote for Senate. The work of Wright and Berkman
(1986) focused on whether decisions by incumbent Senators affected election
outcomes by evaluating the “policy dimension” in Senate seats. Ragsdale and
Rusk (1995) and Kahn and Kenney (1997) evaluate conditions or criteria that
influence the decision making process of citizens in Senate elections. The
research suggests that as a campaign becomes more competitive, the more
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likely citizens are to consider ideology or economic conditions. In addition,
presidential approval and issue formation also may be considered.
Underlying the influence of these factors is the competitiveness of an
election. Competitive races generate more money, which then creates an
environment to attract media attention and increase voter interest. Like
dominoes, competitive races then lead to more public attention and more debate
on policy issues (Kahn and Kenney, 1999). These competitive elections may
cause a “spillover” effect that may factor into other races occurring at the same
point in time. This point is explored in chapter three. The role of competitiveness
in shaping a Senate race manifests itself in a number of other variables including
challenger quality, incumbency, marginality, campaign finance, and partisanship.

Quality Challengers
Quality challengers are defined in terms of characteristics or previous
political experience (Abramowitz 1988, Jacobsen 1989, Shaw 1999a, Stewart,
1989; Westlye, 1991). Evidence suggests that candidate characteristics such as
challenger quality have the strongest influence on the outcomes of the recent
Senate elections (Abramowitz, 1986). A quality challenger is one who is well
known or established in his or her respective state. This can be accomplished
through holding a significant political office or having celebrity status as
mentioned before through Canon (1990). There is an expectation in Senate
elections that the challenger will more likely have held a political office and be
better financed than candidates in other elections.
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Squire and Smith (1996) posit the higher state office one holds, the more
significant a challenger they will be in congressional elections. They developed a
theory ranking each state political office. The higher the state office, the more
points received and thus this officeholder would be expected to be a more
qualified candidate. The assumption is the more visible a political office held is,
the more likely that individual would have the experience and name recognition
to be a quality candidate for Congress. That is, quality challengers are strategic
and will evaluate and analyze which race would be more likely to be competitive,
and basically, winnable.

Incumbency
The incumbency effect has been identified as a key factor in
congressional elections (Abramowitz 1986, 1988; Kritzer and Eubank, 1979;
Campbell and Sumners, 1990; Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983). Calvert and
Ferejohn (1983) suggest that while partisan factors continue to decrease,
incumbency factors continue to increase. Incumbents have the advantage in
most political races because of name recognition and previous campaign
experience. Incumbents traditionally have had the ability to generate resources
early and generally have media access through community events and with
those duties associated with the position (Mayhew, 1974).
Contrary to the opinions of researchers who consider incumbency a strong
factor, Eubank (1985) and Tuckel and Tejera (1983) suggest that a more general
and historical trend in the decline in partisanship connecting one election to
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another has weakened the importance of incumbency. Tuckel and Tejera
suggest a decline in the effects of incumbency in Senate elections and believe
incumbency is tied to local forces unique to congressional races such as
partisanship and attitudes. Their research concludes incumbents have an
indirect effect because of the valuable resources they bring to the table. Tuckel
and Tejera further suggest that the lessened effect of incumbency is an indication
of weakened past constraints of party loyalty and weakened presidential
coattails. They conclude that incumbency can no longer be used as predictive
measure.

Marginality
Prior research has conceptualized the safeness of an incumbent’s seat in
terms of marginality. Stewart suggests that quality challengers are determined
by marginality (1989). Marginality, as used in this thesis, is defined as the past
margin of victory for the incumbent. The prior margin of victory is a strong
predictor of whether or not the incumbent will face a quality challenger in the next
election (Stewart, 1989; Abramowitz, 1988; Bond, Covington and Fleisher, 1985).
The incumbent would be considered vulnerable and have a weakened
incumbency effect if the prior election were close.

Jacobsen noted “measures of

marginality are, in essence, estimates of vulnerability” (2000, 28). That is,
experienced challengers are more likely to make strategic decisions to run
against an incumbent based on the results of the previous election.
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Campaign Finance
Election studies have utilized a variety of campaign expenditures to
consider competitiveness. Congressional election outcomes are considered to
hinge on the challenger’s ability to spend money. Indeed, the single most
important variable in determining whether or not an incumbent can be unseated
is campaign expenditures by the opposition (Abramowitz, 1988; Shaw, 1999a;
Squire and Smith, 1996).
To this end, Abramowitz (1988) suggests that incumbent spending has
less of an impact on Senate elections than challenger spending.

Instead, it is

the amount of money raised by the challenger that shapes the competitiveness of
a race. For incumbents, spending has a diminishing return. In untangling this,
Jacobsen (1980) suggests that there is a point at which incumbent expenditures
begin to hurt the incumbent candidate because incumbents increase spending in
response to the spending of challengers. “As an incumbent candidate spends
more money and becomes better known, the impact of further spending
diminishes” (Abramowitz, 1988, 38). In addition, Jacobsen suggests that
"... incumbents usually exploit their official resources for reaching constituents so
thoroughly that the additional increment of information about their virtues put
forth during the campaign adds comparatively little to what is already known and
felt about them” (2000, 45). Westlye (1983) utilized the two-to-one expenditure
ratio breakpoint to assess if resources were somewhat equal and the campaign
considered competitive. Westlye admits the breakpoint is arbitrary, however, it
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serves as a good indicator of whether the challenger could mount a viable
financial challenge.
Tuckel and Tejera (1983) again contradict dominant research that
suggests incumbent and challenger spending have comparable effects on
average. They suggest that the effects of spending are different based on the
size of each state. Incumbents are favored by campaign spending dynamics in
large states and challengers are favored in small states. This is linked to the
ability to personalize a message and to reach the voting public. Tuckel and
Tejera discuss the ability of a candidate to reach more voters in a smaller state
with less money. However, they did not analyze the differences in population
between some of the larger and smaller states.

Media
Media intensity has been identified as an important measure to determine
the competitiveness of Senate campaigns (Kahn and Kenney 1997).

Senate

races typically generate more intense media coverage than other local elections
or House elections (Abramowitz, 1988) because they are more competitive than
House elections (Abramowitz, 1988; Canon, 1990) and less frequent. Senate
elections are statewide and are considered to have bigger issues at stake.
Tuckel and Tejera (1983) have studied a decline in the traditional factors of
predicting Senate elections and believe that the mass media are becoming the
biggest predictor of campaigns. At the same time, these studies fail to recognize
that media attention is a function of competitive campaigns and quality
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challengers. The more an election is perceived as newsworthy, the more media
coverage it will receive. The media want to focus on elections that are
competitive with a questionable ending that generates curiosity (Campbell,
2000). There must be a competitive election before the media will get involved.
Thus, media exposure is a function or byproduct of a competitive campaign and
accounted for in campaign intensity.

Party Strength and Partisanship
Although the Constitution does not specifically mention political parties,
partisanship has operated as a stabilizing influence for our system (Wattenberg,
1990). The strength of political parties has worked to predict election outcomes,
provide resources for candidates, and secure a base of support for party
candidates (Pomper, 1977). Political parties also have historically had the
responsibility of generating loyalty and political interest. They have served to
mobilize voters and act as socialization agents fostering stability within our
political framework. Political parties provide members a venue by which they
become politically active and work for policy changes. There are a considerable
number of elections in any given year including ballot questions, initiatives, and
races for local, state, and national office.
Kahn and Kenney (1997) suggest that one of the most recognized and
reliable predictors of candidate evaluations is party identification. They also
suggest (1999) that as campaigns become more competitive, citizens are more
likely to consider policy ideology, partisanship, and campaign influences.
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Party

identification would refer to those citizens registered to vote who identify with a
major political party. Kamieniecki (1988) suggests that the more a person
identifies with a particular party, the more they were likely to apply partisan
behavior. Westlye (1991) suggests that citizen partisanship and ideology must
be taken into consideration when there is a strong quality challenger with a
competitive campaign. Political ideology and party strength are important factors
to get out the base vote for candidates, but the key voters in competitive
elections are swing voters. If partisanship identification were the key factor in
election outcomes, then registration alone would be a predictor of winners and
losers.

Conclusion
As the above review suggests, the study of campaigns and elections is
well developed. At the same time, this research has not considered the upward
affect Senate elections have on the state level presidential vote. As such, this
effort differs from much of the prior literature in this area by focusing on the
reverse coattails process. As such, this thesis embraces the premise all politics
is local and local politics can affect national elections including the vote for
president.
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CHAPTER 3

THEORY
This thesis will assess the effects competitive Senate elections have on
the state level vote for president. Specifically, this thesis argues competitive
Senate elections have a positive influence on the presidential vote. The complex
nature of this research requires modeling both Senate and presidential elections
on a state-by-state basis. This establishes control for the influence that
presidential campaigns have on Senate elections while at the same time
assessing the affect that Senate campaigns have on each state's presidential
vote.
In order to account for all causal relationships, this study will identify the
election variables that occur simultaneously at both the state and national level.
National and local campaigns must contend with not only the forces generated by
their own campaign activities, but also those macro level forces that set up the
context in which these campaigns operate. These macro-level variables include
the state of the economy and presidential thermometer ratings.
The argument presented in this chapter draws on the above research
evaluating presidential elections. More specifically, utilizing a multi-level
framework, the thesis assesses how the confluence of macro-level factors affect
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Senate campaigns. It is the macro level factors that are expected to have the
strongest impact on the emergence of quality challengers. These factors set up
the backdrop necessary for competitive Senate elections to have an impact on
the vote for president. The specific hypothesis for this study is “Senate campaign
activity will have a positive affect on the state wide presidential vote” and
“competitive Senate elections will have a positive affect on the state wide
presidential vote.”

Senate Model
There is increasing evidence that campaign effects are best understood
by evaluating those elections that are competitive. By generalizing the effects of
campaigns across any election cycle, the true impact of campaigns may be
skewed because many races are not competitive. In order to accurately address
a reverse coattail relationship between the vote for Senate and the vote for
President, the Senate race must be competitive. With competitive Senate
elections, the local electorate becomes stronger as an overall force and thus
affects the vote for president to a measurable degree. This thesis expects to
see a reverse coattail effect present in competitive Senate elections. This would
be attributable to a decline in partisanship identification and more candidate
centered elections, both of which increase the importance of campaigns in
explaining election outcomes.
As suggested before, identifying competitive Senate elections is important
to address the argument presented in this theory. In order to have a competitive
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election, there must be a quality challenger with a well-financed campaign. This
research includes measures to identify those factors that determine a quality
challenger. Challengers who have previous political experienœ generally have
name recognition and the status likely to generate campaign resources enabling
them to mount a viable challenge (Jacobsen, 2000). This study measures
campaign finances through campaign expenditures. If there is a well-established
challenger who can raise the resources to mount a competitive campaign, that
race will gain exposure and media attention creating a high level of campaign
intensity.
Campaign intensity allows this study to measure the direct effects of
Senate campaigns and competitiveness on presidential state-level voting. To
this end, Campbell (2000) suggests that campaigns may have an influence of
only 4% to 6% on the vote (188). The 2000 presidential election results explain
how 4% could have made a tremendous difference, especially in Florida.^ This
reinforces the premise that campaigns matter when they are competitive. It is in
competitive Senate elections where the “spillover effect” will have a greater
influence on the state level vote for president. Spillover effects would be defined
as those events or actions by another campaign or event that have an impact,
indirectly or directly, on other campaigns For this thesis, competitive Senate
elections will be defined as those elections that have a quality challenger with
previous political experience who is well-financed.

®Bush and Gore’s presidential votes in Florida are significantiy under Campbell’s 4% margin, with
each candidate receiving 48.4% of the vote initially.
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Emergence of Quality Candidates
Incumbency, marginality, and open seats are important variables that
interact with the macro level factors to determine if quality candidates emerge,
and, thus create the potential for competitive elections. Without competitive
Senate campaigns, there is not expected to be a reverse coattail relationship; a
point made in the introductory chapter's overview of the 2004 race between
Harry Reid and Richard Ziser in Nevada. Incumbency itself is a key
consideration. Incumbency is often cited as the major factor in Senate elections.
Abramowitz (1986, 1988), Campbell and Sumners (1990), and Calvert and
Ferejohn (1983) call incumbency the single most important factor in determining
election outcomes. Generally speaking, the more name recognition one
candidate has through incumbency, the more resources a candidate will
generate in terms of money and support. Incumbents have a team of employees
already working when the election cycle begins (Mayhew, 1974). Although
incumbency is important, these same studies demonstrate the incumbency effect
is diminished when there is a quality challenger; likewise other factors such as
marginality and an open seat must be taken into consideration.
Marginality has often been cited as a determining factor as to whether or
not an incumbent faces a quality challenger. The emergence of a quality
challenger is crucial for an election to be competitive. If the last election proved
to be close, then the incumbent is seen as vulnerable and can expect a wellfinanced and quality challenger from the opposing party in the next election. In
general. Senate races are more competitive than House seats because Senate
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seats are seen as more valuable (Jacobsen, 1986). With a small level of
marginality, these factors set up the scenario for quality challengers to be enticed
in the election to run against an established incumbent.
Unlike marginality, which may generate competitive elections when the
previous election was seen as close, open seats produce the most competitive
elections because they generate a higher level of voter turn out and attract
quality candidates from both parties (Jacobsen, 2000). The candidates do not
have to consider incumbency or marginality, because most likely both will have
previous political experience and be more or less on an equal footing. The
candidate in the open-seat who generates the most resources and exposure
should benefit the presidential candidate of the same party. In terms of coattail
effects, the results of an open Senate election will generally be a “wash”, as the
campaigns run by both candidates will likely counter balance one another. It is in
these “open seat” elections that the local political dynamics and structure may
prove to be most influential. This type of election would illustrate the point of how
campaign effects might cancel each other out as suggested by Campbell (2000)
depending on the macro level variables.

Presidential Model
As mentioned in chapter two, other research has focused on presidential
coattails as a one-way causation, from the president downward. This study will
differ from previous work by suggesting a reverse coattail relationship from the
bottom-up. The key to understanding this relationship is recognizing the multiple
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dynamics of the election process and the symbiotic relationship between state
and national elections. More specifically, by identifying competitive Senate
elections one can analyze the influence that “local politics ' have on the vote for
President, while accounting for the effect of presidential campaigns on the
contemporaneous Senate races.
As outlined above, Holbrook’s original model included measures for state
unemployment, change in state income, party strength, state ideology, state
ideology interaction, a dummy for the South, presidential and vice presidential
home state, presidential popularity, presidential home region, as well as
economic measures such as percent change in national income and national
unemployment rate. The percent change in national income is similar to the
measure used by Abramowitz and Segal (1986), Holbrook's model will be
modified to incorporate Senate campaign intensity as well as other modifications,
including presidential campaign activity.
Presidential campaign activity will be included in the presidential model
utilizing Shaw's work (1999a). Shaw measured campaign intensity by counting
the number of times a presidential candidate visited each state as well as
additional work that focused on media buys. There is little doubt national
campaigns influence local elections. A visit by a presidential candidate to any
state is suggested to provide a boost to the campaigns of the local political
hopefuls of the same party (Shaw, 1999a). That is, while this visit is intended to
strengthen the presidential candidate’s base vote, it can have spillover effects on
other elections. Shaw argues in some cases presidential candidates will visit
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States they are expected to lose to help turn down ticket races (1999b).
Presidential campaign activity for this thesis will be measured based on the
number of times a presidential candidate campaigned in each state during the
1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 election years from Labor Day until Election Day.
The information on presidential visits is not avaialbe for campaigns prior to 1988.
Holbrook’s model included a variable for home state influence for
presidential and vice presidential candidates. Campbell (2000) and Holbrook
(1991) suggest that the presidential or vice presidential candidate will gain
several percentage points for the home state advantage. This variable would be
expected to capture any additional influences of campaign intensity along with
presidential campaign visits. Additionally, this model was unable to include
Shaw’s media buys for presidential campaign activity because the information
was available only for 1988, 1992, and 1996. This would not provide enough
cases to show a systematic effect.

Macro-Level Variables
Holbrook provided a national measure of presidential popularity and a
measure for the state of the economy.

Both the presidential vote as well as the

Senate vote is affected by macro level factors. The economic variable is a
macro level variable that influences voting choices as well as providing the
backdrop for quality challengers to emerge. According to Wattenberg (1991 ),
economic measures have been steadily increasing their importance with the
voting electorate while factors such as partisanship have been decreasing.
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Senate and House incumbents are often held responsible, along with the
president, for the state of the economy (Campbell 1987). This thesis includes
similar macro level variables such as the national unemployment rate and the
percent change in national income, as used by Holbrook. These variables will
help measure the impact of the economy on the vote. The state of the economy
can also affect the emergence of quality challengers.

If it is a bad year for the

President’s party because of a slow economy, one is less likely to see quality
challengers emerge from that party.®
A booming economy and a popular president (or presidential candidate)
are assumed to favor the party in power; economic problems and other
national failings are blamed on the administration are costly to its
congressional candidates. Exactly those things that politicians and
political scientists who look at aggregate data believe influence
congressional voters also guide the strategic decision of potential
candidates and contributors. (Campbell, 2000,154)

Quality challengers would more likely emerge from the opposition party in
this scenario. The effect of these macro-level variables on the presidential vote
is straightforward. If the public mood from war or recession is working against
the president or his party, this will hurt the president and his party and candidate
emergence. Alternatively, if the economy is strong, this would be expected to
boost the votes for the president and his party.

Shaw’s data (1999b) discusses how scandals or blunders can affect the vote. This theory will
not include any variables that measure scandals or media blunders. In addition, this model does
not include any outside influences such as war.
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Partisanship and Ideology
As detailed above, campaigns are complex with a multitude of short-and
long-term election forces occurring simultaneously. As a consequence,
explaining election outcomes and vote choice cannot be reduced to analyzing
partisan registration. While it is important to consider partisan registration, the
more important consideration would be to identify inveterate voters and swing
voters. The swing vote in states creates the environment where campaigns
become important. In addition, the number of independent voters on state
registration documents also provides a target for campaigns to make a
difference.
State-level partisanship historically has been a key indicator of how a state
may vote in an upcoming presidential election.

Identifying with a political party

led many to simply disregard other candidates. In more recent years, there has
been an increase in the number of voters who identify themselves as
independent and an increase in the number of swing voters. Through the years,
most research, except for Bartels, demonstrates a decline in party identification
to a voter mainstream that considers itself more moderate. Although partisan
identification has weakened slightly over the past decade, it is still an important
factor to consider when evaluating election outcomes. With the increase of
independent and swing voters, the stability of the state political party structure
weakens, as does straight ticket voting. This begins to strengthen the impact of
local voting and, more importantly, campaigns.
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Party identification is not as clear-cut as it once was. The voting dynamics
have shifted from being party-based to being candidate-centered. This
candidate-centered focus has encouraged more individuality, with an increase in
the number of individuals classifying themselves as independents or becoming
“swing voters.”

Swing voters are defined as those citizens registered as either a

Democrat or a Republican who do not vote strictly along party lines or citizens
registered as Independents. The decline in partisanship and the increasing
number of independent voters have diminished the presidential coattail effect and
enhanced the impact of local competitive elections (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983).
Campaigns have increased their importance in an attempt to reach these
independent and swing voters. It is important to keep in mind campaigns are
designed to secure the party base and persuade those swing and independent
voters of a candidate’s worthiness (Damore, 2004).

Conditions for Reverse Coattail Effect
The macro-level variables including presidential popularity, state ideology,
and the economy set-up the conditions for reverse coattails to be present. The
president should benefit from some reverse coattails when the macro-level
variables benefit the Senate challenger from the president’s party. This scenario
would produce a quality candidate able to mount a strong challenge against the
incumbent. The campaign intensity would generate a high level of interest from
party members, thus the reverse coattails. Consequently, when the same
macro-levels do not favor the president’s party and the Senate challenger is from
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the president’s party, reverse coattails would not be expected. This would
primarily be because the Senate race would not be considered competitive by
the variables previously discussed in this study. Unless there is a quality
challenger and, thus, a competitive election, there is not expected to be reverse
coattails.
Additionally, one would not expect to see a reverse coattail effect if the
macro-level variables favor the president’s party, and the Senate challenger is
from the challenger party competing against an incumbent from the president’s
party. This situation would be unlikely to produce a quality challenger. Also,
there is the chance the Senate campaign may actually help the challenger’s party
presidential candidate. This could occur if the macro-level variables do not favor
the President’s party, and the Senate challenger is from the opposition party
competing against an incumbent from the President’s party. These macro-level
variables coupled with campaign intensity provide the basis for this theory.
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CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
Presidential coattail theories and Senate campaign models have
traditionally utilized standard multiple regression models focusing on the
campaign process operations in isolation. These studies fail to capture the
causal relationships between independent variables occurring simultaneously at
different levels. If a causal relationship exists among campaign variables at
different levels, an ordinary least squares regression model (OLS) examining
only one level will not capture those effects.
In order to overcome these shortcomings, this thesis presents three
regression models. The first is labeled the “naive model” because it looks at
Senate and presidential races in isolation. Specifically, it estimates separate
models for the presidential and Senate election that do not consider the spillover
effects. The second model extends the first by examining the spillover effects
between Senate and presidential elections. Again, it estimates separate models
for the presidential and Senate election, but includes variables tapping the
campaign activity of the other race. The last model presents a causal analysis of
the entire process that captures both the direct and indirect relationships among
the variables and as such, provides a more complete analysis of the causal
process of interest.
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For all models, the Senate contest is the unit of analysis. The data were
originally designed to capture the two-party vote. This proved to be problematic
since it did not capture the incumbency effects or the economic effects present in
either the presidential or Senate races. Additionally, the two-party system
measurements of Republican and Democrat did not permit the standard OLS or
causal model to effectively measure some of the variables created in this study.
Based on these concerns, both analyses are conceptualized in terms of the
White House incumbent party. That is, the party of the current president during
the election year would be considered the incumbent party. For example, in the
2000 election, President Bill Clinton was the Democrat President in the White
House. However, due to term limits, he was unable to run again. Since he was
the sitting president at the time of the 2000 election, the incumbent party for 2000
was coded as Democrat.
One obstacle to evaluating Senate elections is the Federal Election
Commission (EEC) reports were not required until 1974. This does not permit
campaign financial data to be included in election studies prior to 1974. This
study is unable to consider Senate elections prior to 1976 because this research
utilizes EEC campaign expenditure data to help isolate competitive Senate
elections. Based on the financial data, this thesis initially compiled data for 230
Senate campaigns from 1976-2000. Table 4-1 provides a detailed listing of each
variable and description.
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Table 4.1

Variables and Definitions

VARIABLE
Percent Change
National Product
Unemployment
Partisanship
Quality
Challenger
Seat Type
(Casual M o d e lf
Marginality

DEFINITION
The percent change in net national product (Macro
variable)
National level unemployment rate (Macro variable)
Percent of IP'' in the State Legislature
IP candidate with previous political experience 1; CP
candidate with previous political experience -1 ; and
neither or both having previous political experience 0.
Trichotomous measure for Senate seat type: 1 for IP
Seat Advantage; -1 for CP Seat Advantage; 0 for open
seat®.
Trichotomous Measure: IP race within 10% coded as -1;
CP race within 10% as 1; Coded as 0 if over 10%.
IP cost per voter for money spent through 12/31 of
campaign year
CP Cost Per voter for money spent through 12/31 of
campaign year
Senate State level vote for the presidential IP

Senate Campaign
Intensity (IP)
Senate Campaign
Intensity (CP)
Senate State
Level Vote
(IP) Presidential
Number of IP presidential candidate visits to each state
Campaign Activity from Labor Day to Election Da/®
(CP) Presidential Number of CP Presidential candidate visits to each state
Campaign Activity from Labor Day to Election Day
Presidential
For the causal model, the Presidential campaign variable
Campaign Activity was changed to reflect Shaw’s original data and used the
(Casual Model)
difference between the IP Visits and CP Visits
Presidential State The Incumbent’s Party share of the State Level two party
Level Vote
presidential vote.
Home State
Home state (registered to vote) of Presidential or Vice
Advantage
Presidential candidate. Coded as 1 for IP, -1 for CP - all
other states coded as 0
Presidential
NES data on national presidential thermometer ratings.
Thermometer
Incumbency
Incumbent Party Incumbent Advantage coded as 1,
Challenger Party Incumbent Advantage coded as -1 , and
no incumbent is 0.
IP is incumbent Party; CP is Challenger Party: Incumbent Party is determined by the current
Administration in the White House during election year.
®Where Noted “Causal Model” the variable was operationalized different for the OLS and Causal
Model.
®Seat type does not capture open seat advantage, but Instead attempts to capture the advantage
of the Incumbent or Challenger Party on Competitive Senate Races.
10
Shaw’s (1999a) Data
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Another area where data collection was problematic was identifying a
state level variable to capture presidential campaign activity. The state level
presidential variables that were available both came from Shaw. Shaw's TV Ad
buy data were compiled 1988, 1992 and 1996. However, the information was not
available to create a comparable measure for 2000. Shaw’s presidential visit
data also analyzed 1988, 1992 and 1996. The information on presidential state
visits was readily available to create a comparable measure for 2000. Based on
the need to include a presidential campaign variable, this precluded any inclusion
of Senate elections prior to 1988. Kahn and Kenney’s (1997) media measure
was considered, but this data was not easily duplicated and there was the issue
of continuity among years. While other state level presidential campaign finance
variables were researched, state level financial data was not required or
recorded by the Federal Election Commission.^^ As a consequence of these
data limitations, the campaign cycles that are used here are 1988, 1992, 1996
and 2000, resulting in 133 cases. With the deletion of Louisiana from the study
because of the state’s requirements for candidates to receive over 50% of the
vote, the resulting number of observations is 127.
The information filed in FEC reports and recorded through government
resources is deemed accurate and reliable as part of the warehousing of political
information. The information obtained through state and federal sources are also
considered accurate, as a standard in political science research. The above

Ad buy data for 2000 is now available through Goldstein (2004). This could possibly more
effectively capture state level presidential campaign activity, for future research.
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information is considered reliable. All information was transferred to obtain
accuracy so ttiere would not be any validity issues.

Presidential Model
As discussed before, this study modified Holbrook’s (1991) model of state
level presidential voting. Holbrook’s model utilized a pooled, cross-sectional
approach to demonstrate both state and national forces that influence a
presidential election. This thesis operated under the same premise presented by
Holbrook that there are state and national level forces that affect presidential
elections.
This research utilized the President Incumbent Party’s State Level Vote as
the dependent variable. This is measured in terms of the White House
incumbent’s party share of the state level two-party vote. Initially, this variable
was coded as the Democrat’s share of the two-party vote, but the measure had
to be modified to account for incumbency effects and the influence of macro
conditions.
This thesis used the following independent variables in the presidential
regression models; Home State, Partisanship, Presidential Thermometer
Ratings, Unemployment, and the Percent Change In National P roduct

In

addition to the state and national level factors, the presidential model includes a
measure of Presidential Campaign Activity to account for presidential campaign
effects on a state-by-state basis. For the presidential spillover, a variable of
Senate Campaign Intensity was used to capture the Senate campaign effects.
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This was operationalized as the cost per voter for the presidential incumbent
party Senate challenger and the presidential incumbent party Senate incumbent.
As utilized in Shaw’s (1999a) research, Presidential Campaign Activity is
measured based on the number of times a presidential candidate traveled to
each state from Labor Day to Election Day. Presidential campaign appearances
allow presidential candidates to gain greater exposure in each state and
generate their own campaign forces (Shaw, 1999a). Shaw’s data are utilized for
the 1988, 1992, and 1996 elections. A comparable measure has been created
for 2000 by reviewing available data on Bush and Gore presidential state visits
from Labor Day to Election Day.^^ The same time frame was utilized to maintain
consistency. As discussed above, data were not available for previous election
years limiting this thesis’ ability to increase the number of observations.
State level presidential popularity and thermometer ratings are considered
macro level variables that create the backdrop for both Senate and presidential
campaigns. Beyle, Niemi, and Sigelman (2002) created job approval ratings for
presidents. Senators, and governors from state level public opinion polls.
However, this data did not include all states for each year. The information is not
available to evaluate state level presidential thermometer or popularity ratings on
a state-by-state basis. Based on this data limitation, this thesis had to utilize the
national presidential thermometer ratings. The national popularity ratings in
Holbrook’s model initially utilized the Gallup-poll, while this research used the
presidential thermometer data from the National Election Studies guide.

C alen dars w e re obtained on ww w .Doliticsandelections.com .

NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior http://www.umich.edu/ nes/nesguide
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The status of the economy is considered an important factor in
campaigns. The National Unemployment data, as well as The Percent Change in
Net National Product both serve as the economic variables. These macro level

measures provide the backdrop for campaigns to matter and to determine if a
quality challenger may emerge. The Percent Change in Net National Product has
been gathered through labor statistics.^'* The percent change in net national
product is detailed and compiled for this study. The national level Unemployment
figures were gathered from the labor statistics website.*® The economic
variables are expected to perform as strong macro level variables influencing the
Senate and presidential elections.
As discussed earlier, partisanship is an important consideration in state
and national elections. It was not possible to utilize partisan registration on a
state-by-state basis for a variety of reasons. First, the partisan numbers are
inconsistent. That is, state numbers and federal election numbers are not always
identical. In addition, some states update their numbers, which causes some
confusion with the data. Also, not all states register voters based on party and
some states allow voter registration on Election Day. Considering the above, a
new partisanship variable was created. The Partisanship variable was created
by determining the percent of legislative members from the incumbent party in
each state legislature. By obtaining the number of Republican and Democrat
members of each state’s legislature, this thesis was able to create a partisanship

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economics Analysis, Marcti 2004.
(www.bea.doc.gov)
^ U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 2004. (www.bls.gov)
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variable. The partisanship variable is expected to impact both the presidential
state level and Senate state level vote in a positive manner.
Holbrook’s (1991) research suggested that presidential and vice
presidential candidates receive a boost in terms of a percent of the vote from
their home state. This is termed Home State Advantage. This thesis was able to
research the home states (defined as those states that presidential and vice
presidential candidates were registered to vote in) for both the incumbent and
challenger presidential party candidates. The variable is coded as 1 for
incumbent party home state and -1 for the challenger party home state. All other
states were coded as 0.
In order to evaluate spillover effects, an additional variable is added to the
presidential model. To examine the influence that intensity of the Senate race
has on the outcome of the presidential election within a state, this thesis includes
a variable to account for the amount of money spent by the candidates in the
Senate election. This is constructed as a cost per voter variable and is explained
in more detail below.

Senate Model
As with the presidential model, a naive Senate model was developed to
provide a baseline for comparison. This research utilized the incumbent party’s
Senate State Level Vote as the dependent variable. This is measured in terms of

This variable is not perfect because of gerrymandering that typically provides the majority party
with a small seat advantage. Additional variables were considered such as the vote in the last
gubernatorial race. However, because of incumbency effects, this measure is problematic.
Further research would require the development of a more precise measurement of partisanship.
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the White House incumbent’s party share of the state level two-party vote. The
Senate model includes the following independent variables: Incumbency,
Challenger Quality, Senate Campaign Intensity, Marginality, and Partisanship.

As indicated earlier, having a quality challenger has been determined to
be one of the most important factors in Senate election outcomes. As discussed
in chapter two, to be considered competitive, a quality challenger must have
previous political experience. This thesis coded the variable of Quality
Challenger as the incumbent party Senate candidate with previous political

experience with 1, while the Senate candidate from the challenger party with
previous political experience was coded -1. Any Senate candidate that had
neither candidate holding previous political experience or both holding political
experience were coded as 0. The information about Senate candidates was
gathered through Congressional Quarterly Reports and the American Political
Almanac.

Because the American Political Almanac provides only previous job

experience for those Senate candidates who were actually elected, it was
necessary to use both resources to identify those races considered to have a
“quality challengers” based on prior political experience.
Senate Campaign Intensity is measured in terms of campaign

expenditures. More specifically, this thesis utilized a cost per voter variable. The
amount spent through December 31®* of the election year on the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) reports was compared to the number of registered voters in
each state on Election Day. By dividing the expenditures with the registered
voters in each state, this determined a cost per voter ratio. This thesis would
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expect to see campaign expenditures as having a significant impact on the
presidential and Senate state level vote. In addition, it is expected that Senate
challenger party financial expenditures would have a direct impact on the Senate
incumbent party financial expenditures as suggested by Jacobsen (2000).
Incumbency has been an important element in political science research.
Initially, this thesis was designed and the variables coded as either Republican or
Democrat. After further data collection and the initial analysis, it was determined
that the variables could be measured properly only by utilizing the incumbent
party. This was designed to capture the economic macro level effects affecting
the current administration and Senate campaign.

In addition, it was important to

provide a control variable of Incumbency in Senate elections.

By analyzing

incumbency, this thesis was able to measure the competitiveness and
differences between marginal races with an incumbent. The information on
incumbency was gathered from congressional voting records and the FEC data.
An additional variable to account for the incumbent party advantage was created.
This information for seat type was coded as 1 for the Senate incumbent of the
presidential incumbent party and -1 for the Senate challenger of the presidential
challenger party. A 0 was designated for an open race.
A Senate incumbent whose previous vote share was less than 60%, would
expect to see a quality challenger emerge for the next election cycle. This study
created a variable for Marginality, which included only marginal races were within
60%. Utilizing the Almanac and Congressional Quarterly special reports for each
election year, this thesis was able to determine the margin of win for incumbent
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candidates prior victories. Marginality was coded by utilizing a trichotomous
variable. The coding was -1 for a Senate race that was within 10% for the
incumbent party, 1 if the race was within 10% for the Senate challenger party. If
there was not a close race, within 10% during the last election, the marginality
was coded as 0.
As with the presidential model, the Senate Partisanship variable was
measured as the percent of the incumbent party in the state legislature. As with
the presidential models, the state level of partisanship is important for Senate
campaigns.

In addition to the above variables, the Senate spillover model also

included the above measures of Presidential Campaign Activity (the visit data) to
control for any top down campaign effects from the presidential to the Senate
contest. As mentioned before when discussing the presidential model, this
variable is not ideal, but it permits some level of spillover analysis on a state-bystate basis.

Causal Model
By utilizing a standard OLS model for the naive and spillover presidential
and Senate election models, this thesis was able to identify the direct effects of
the independent variables. However, these models do not account for a more
sophisticated analysis of the causal process of interest. To account for this, the
above spillover models were expanded into a causal model format, which allows
for a more complex path analysis model to be developed. Specifically, this
technique allows the thesis to examine if the competitiveness of the Senate race.
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in addition to the Senate campaign intensity, influences the state level
presidential vote.
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CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analyses used to
examine the thesis' main concern: under what conditions do Senate elections
affect the state level vote for the presidency? This chapter begins with an
overview of the analysis and modeling process and then presents the results
from the presidential and Senate naive models. The discussion then moves into
the regression models that specifically examine spillover effects between Senate
and presidential elections. Finally, the analysis for the causal model is
presented.

Naïve Model Results
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics for the presidential naive model
and Table 5.2 presents the model’s parameter estimates. Turning first to the
statistics assessing the overall model performance, it appears the inclusion of the
independent variables makes a significant improvement in predicting the
dependent variable, incumbent party Presidential State Level Vote. Specifically,
the value of the F test, 17.639, indicates the inclusion of the independent
variables makes a significant improvement over the intercept alone. This F value
is statistically significant beyond the .001 level. The adjusted R^ indicates that
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48.4% of the vote for the incumbent party Presidential State Level Vote is
captured by the model’s independent variables: Partisanship, Presidential
Thermometer, Home State Advantage, Unemployment, the Percent Change in
National Product, and Presidential Campaign Activity. The Standard Error of the

Estimate is 6.19 indicating predictions in the dependent variable are on average
off by just over 6%.

Table 5.1

Model
1

Presidential Naïve Model Summarv

R
.717®

R Square
.513

Adjusted R
Square
.484

Std. Error of
the Estimate
6.19368

The performance of the coefficients presented in Table 5.2 suggests some
support for the hypotheses developed above. Specifically, inspection of the
slope estimates indicates that Partisanship and the Percent o f Change in
National Product exert strong and significant influence on the dependent

variable, the Presidential State Level Vote. Prior research suggests that
economic conditions are strong predictors of presidential performance. As such,
the performance of the variable on the Presidential State Level Vote may be
influenced by the economic variables in the model. Surprisingly, Home State
Advantage is statistically insignificant, suggesting presidential and vice

presidential candidates do not systematically receive a boost in the vote in their
home state.

51

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Turning next to campaign activity, although both variables are in the
predicted direction, neither obtains conventional levels of statistical significance.
Challenger Party Presidential Campaign Activity is significant at the .065 level for

a one-tailed test. Surprisingly, Presidential Campaign Activity, defined as the
number of times a presidential candidate visited a state from Labor Day through
Election Day, fails to obtain conventional levels of statistical significance.
Specifically, the variable is coded as the number of visits made by the incumbent
and challenger party presidential candidates to each state.
With respect to the less than expected performance of the presidential
campaign variables, two factors are suspected that may be dampening their
effect. First, given a larger sample size, the variables may prove to be
statistically significant. Second, the weak performance also may be a problem in
measurement rather than theory. As mentioned before, a state level presidential
campaign expenditure variable would have been a stronger measure.*^ In an
attempt to determine if the poor statistical performance was a function of
operationalization, this thesis also modeled the variable similar to Shaw’s work
(1999a) for the OLS models, from which the data were obtained. Specifically,
Shaw models visits in terms of the difference in visits between candidates.
However, when this measure is used, it performs similarly.

Reeves, Chen and Nagano attempted to duplicate Shaw’s work. The Harvard researcher’s
concluded that when they followed the methods as prescribed in Shaw’s research, they were
unable to reproduce the substantive claims. Thus, there is still some debate as to the veracity of
the analysis presented by Shaw (1999a).
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Table 5.2

Presidential Naïve Model

Partisanship
Home State Advantage
Unemployment
(Economy 1)
National Product
(Economy 2)
Presidential Thermometer
Presidential Campaign Activity
(IP)
Presidential Campaign Activity
(CP)

b

t

19.483
(3.758)
-2.400
(2.072)
-1.365
(.686)
10.027
(2.323)
.401
(.371)
.379
(.348)
-.491
(.323)

5.185*
-.984
-1.989*
4.316*
1.081
1.089
-1.521

N=127

Table 5.3 presents the summary statistics for the naive Senate model and
Table 5.4 presents the parameter estimates for the model. Overall, the model
performed well. The assessment of the F test and

statistics suggest that the

explanatory power of the model is quite strong. Specifically, the value of the F
test, 28.364, indicates the inclusion of the independent variables makes a
significant improvement over the intercept alone. This F value is statistically
significant at the .001 level. The adjusted R^ demonstrates that 56.8% of the
Senate State Level Vote is captured by Incumbency, Challenger Quality, Senate
Campaign Intensity, Marginality and Partisanship. The Standard Error of the

Estimate of .08173 indicates that the average prediction error is less than .08%
suggesting a strong fit between data and theory.
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Table 5.3

Model
1

Senate Naïve Model Summarv

R
.767a

R Squared
.588

Adjusted R
Square
.568

Std. Error of
the Estimate
.08173

More importantly, all the variables in the Senate model are statistically
significant and in the predicted direction. Interpretation of the parameter
estimates suggest a good deal of the variation in the Senate vote can be
explained by factors exogenous to the campaign process as demonstrated by the
magnitude and significance of Incumbency, Marginality, and Partisanship. For
every one-unit increase in Partisanship (Incumbent party’s percent of the state
legislature), the Senate State Level Vote increases by .1%. Similarly, a marginal
incumbent may, on average, draw nearly 5% less of the vote. Additionally, if a
marginal incumbent is facing a quality challenger, their share of the vote could be
reduced an additional 5%.
The analysis also indicates that campaign activity affects the vote in
Senate elections. The beta weights indicate that the campaign activity of the
incumbent and challenger party campaigns exert strong substantive effects on
the Senate State Level vote. Specifically, the standard standardized coefficient
for the Incumbent Party Senate Campaign Intensity is .288 and the Challenger
Party Senate Campaign Intensity is -.224. In summary, the Senate naive model

indicates that both campaign activity and the macro level variables that establish
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the context of a specific race are central to explaining Senate elections
outcomes. The analysis supports the premise that campaigns do matter.

Table 5.4

Senate Naive Model

Incumbency
Marginality
Challenger Quality
Partisanship
Senate Campaign Intensity
(IP)
Senate Campaign Intensity
(CP)

b

t

.132
(.027)
-.047
(.016)
.045
(.014)
.102
(.048)
.018
(.005)
-.014
(.004)

4.901*
-2.941*
3.143*
2.110*
4.043*
-3.200*

N=127

Spillover Models
The presidential and Senate spillover models provide, which are designed
to capture the influence that Senate and presidential campaign activity have on
each other, provide the best test to the hypothesis that campaign activity targeted
at one race may affect the outcomes of other races occurring simultaneously.
Table 5.5 presents the presidential spillover model summary and Table 5.6
presents the results for the presidential spillover model and Table 5.7 and 5.8
present the model summary statistics and the parameter estimates for the
Senate spillover models.
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Turning first to Table 5.5, the summary statistics suggest that the
presidential spillover model, which accounts for Senate Campaign Intensity,
performs better than the presidential naive model. Specifically, the value of the F
test, 14.954, indicates the inclusion of the independent variables makes a
significant improvement over the intercept alone. The F value is significant,
beyond the .001 level. The adjusted

demonstrated 50.3% of the Presidential

State Level Vote is captured by Partisanship, Presidential Thermometer, Home
State Advantage, Unemployment, the Percent Change in National Product,
Presidential Campaign Activity and Senate Campaign Intensity. The Standard

Error of the Estimate of 6.07960 is a slight improvement over the presidential
naive model. While the values for these statistics are improvements over the
naive model, further evidence of an improvement over the presidential naive
model was demonstrated by performing an F change test.*® This thesis was able
to conclude the addition of the Senate Campaign Intensity variables to the
presidential spillover model significantly improved the model at the .05 (p=.04)
level with an F value of 3.24.

Table 5.5

Model
1

Summarv of Presidential Spillover Model

R
,734a

R Squared
.539

Adjusted R
Square
.503

Std. Error of
the Estimate
.607960

The F change test allows one to determine if the inclusion of additional independent variables
(represented here as the spillover model) results in a statistically significant improvement over the
reduced model (e.g., the naive models).
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Similar to the presidential naive model, Partisanship, Unemployment, and
the Percent Change in National Product are highly significant, allowing the null

hypothesis for these variables to be rejected. As discussed before, the Senate
Campaign Intensity v/as added to this model to assess the spillover effects from

the Senate campaign to the presidential campaign. Incumbent Party Senate
Campaign Intensity proved to be statistically significant at the .005 level.

This

campaign variable provides the best evidence for the main argument that Senate
campaigns can affect the vote for president. The beta weights indicate that
Incumbent Party Senate Campaign Intensity exerts substantive effects on the
Presidential State Level Vote. Specifically, the standard standardized coefficient

for the lncuml)ent Party Senate Campaign Intensity is .175.
The Challenger Party Senate Campaign Intensity showed a significance
level of .06 for a one-tailed test. The performance of the challenger variable is
not at all surprising given that incumbents spend in response to the challenger.
This is primarily due to the notion that incumbents increase their spending in
response to the spending of challengers. Thus, the measure of the Senate
Campaign Intensity is what happens before they react to the challenger.

As with the original model, and probably for the same reasons. Table 5.6
illustrates how Home State Advantage and Presidential Thermometer Ratings
failed to reach statistical significance. In addition, the Presidential Campaign
Activity did not demonstrate significance. Challenger Party Presidential
Campaign Activity approaches conventional levels of significance (p=-.07). As

mentioned before, Shaw’s variable may not be the best measurement of
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presidential campaign activity.

Ideally, the variable that would have been used

here would measure the total dollars spent by each presidential campaign in
each state.

Table 5.6

Presidential Spillover Model

Partisanship
Home State Advantage
Unemployment (Economy 1)
Percent Change in National
Product
(Economy 2)
Presidential Thermometer
Presidential Campaign Activity
(IP)
Presidential Campaign Activity
(CP)
Senate Campaign Intensity
(IP)
Senate Campaign Intensity
(CP)

b

t

18.522
(3.757)
1.467
(2.085)
-1.409
(.675)
10.080
(2.298)

4.930*

.358
(.367)
.393
(.342)
-.467
(.322)
.763
(.314)
-.471
(.309)

.704
-2.087*
4.387*

.975
1.149
-1.451
2.429*
-1.525

N=127

Table 5.7 presents the summary statistics for the Senate spillover model
summary and Table 5.8 presents the parameter estimates for the Senate
spillover model. As was the case with the presidential models, the summary
statistics for the spillover model suggest some improvement in the model
performance as compared to the Senate naive model. Specifically, the F value
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of 21.494 indicates the inclusion of the independent variables makes a significant
improvement over the intercept along. The F Value is significant performing at
the .001 level. The adjusted

demonstrates 57.1% of the Senate State Level

Vote is captured by Incumbency, Challenger Quality, Senate Campaign Intensity,
Marginality, Partisanship, and Presidential Campaign Activity.

Table 5.7

Model
1

Summarv of Senate Spillover Model

R
774a

R Squared
.599

Adjusted R
Square
.571

Std. Error of
the Estimate
.08175

The Standard Error of the Estimate of .08175 indicates that the average
prediction error is less than .08%, again suggesting a strong fit between data and
theory. However, while the spillover model did perform well, the F change test,
which compares if the inclusion of the additional independent variables
significantly improves the model, is statistically insignificant. That is, the
inclusion of Presidential Campaign Activity variables did not statistically improve
the overall performance of the model at the .05 (p=.20) level with an F value of
1.591068. This is most likely the case because the additional variables
themselves. Presidential Campaign Activity, were statistically insignificant.
As with the Senate naive model, all of the independent variables are
statistically significant and in the predicted direction for the spillover model. As
such, the parameter estimates suggest that the statewide Senate vote can be
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accounted for by factors both exogenous to the actual campaign, as well as by
campaign activity. Specifically, the magnitude of the estimates for Incumbency,
Marginality and Partisanship indicate strong substantive effects. Moreover,

inspection of the model’s beta weights, indicate that Incumbency make a larger
contribution in predicting the variance in the dependent variable as compared to
Marginality (Incumbency = .522; Marginality = -.245J.

At the same time, the beta weights also indicate that the campaign activity
of the incumbent and challenger party campaigns exert strong substantive effects
on the vote. Specifically, the standard standardized coefficients for the
Incumbent Party Senate Campaign Intensity is .284, -.211 for the Challenger
Party Senate Campaign Intensity, and .224 for Challenger Quality. However, as

was the case with the presidential spillover model, neither of the variables taping
presidential campaign activity performed as expected.
Specifically, although the Challenger Party Presidential Campaign Activity
and Incumbent Party Presidential Campaign Activity are in the predicted
direction, both fail to obtain conventional levels of statistical significance. The
results indicate that presidential campaign activity (measured in terms of visits)
does not exert a direct influence on the Senate vote.

^®Prior work examining presidential coattails generally has not modeled the relationship between
presidential and congressional election outcomes by directly assessing the influence of
presidential campaign activity on individual Senate and House races. Rather, this research tends
to account for coattails by simply comparing the aggregate election outcomes of presidential and
congressional elections. As such, the findings presented here bring into question the underlying
causal mechanism asserted by the coattails literature.
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Table 5.8

Senate Spillover Model

Incumbency
Marginality
Challenger Quality
Partisanship
Senate Campaign Intensity (IP)
Senate Campaign Intensity
(CP)
Presidential Campaign (IP)
Presidential Campaign (CP)

b

T

.136
(.027)
-.046
(.016)
.044
(.015)
.117
(.049)
.018
(.005)
-.013
(.004)
.006
(.005)
-.004
(004)

4.997*
-2.845*
3.015*
2.371*
3.935*
-2.940*
1.298
-1.013

N=127

This model supports the research that campaigns matter. Challenger
Quality and Incumbent Party Campaign Intensity resulted in higher standardized

coefficients (beta weight) than Partisanship. This would suggest that campaign
effects are important considerations when explaining the Senate State Level
Vote. In summary, the Senate spillover model indicates both campaign activity

and the context of the race are central to Senate election outcomes.

Causal Model
The above models provide some support for the thesis’ primary contention
that Senate campaign intensity affects the statewide vote for president. At the
same time, these analyses are largely static and as such, are unable to capture
the nature of a causal process that unfolds over time. To capture this aspect of
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the process of interest, this thesis applies causal modeling techniques to the
data. These techniques allow one to assess the direct and indirect influences
within a system of variables. By analyzing the multiple variables occurring during
the campaign process simultaneously, this thesis follows the growing number of
campaign and election studies that focus on the multi-layered dynamics that are
present in the campaign process such as Kahn and Kenney (1997), Damore
(2004), and Nicholson (2005).
As is customary with causal modeling, the beta weights are used to
assess both direct and indirect paths.^° The actual estimation process involves
first specifying the paths among the independent variables and dependent
variables to capture the underlying causal process. Figure 5.1 presents a
schematic of the causal process without the estimates. The causal model is
designed to assess if the competitiveness of the Senate race, in addition to the
Senate campaign influences tested by the OLS Models, influence the dependent
variable, the Presidential State Level Vote. The causal model variables had
several modifications from the OLS Models. First, Home State Advantage and
Presidential Thermometer were deleted from the causal model after failing to

reach statistical significance in the presidential spillover model. Additionally,
based on the high correlated values of the Presidential Campaign Activity
variables (.803), the causal model used the difference in visits as reflected in
Shaw’s (1999a) original data. Lastly, Seat Type was included to account for the
Senate incumbency advantage as determined by the presidential incumbent

Beta weights are the standardized coefficients, allowing one to make comparisons in the
magnitudes of variables that are measured using different metrics.
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party. These modifications permitted this model to capture both the direct and
indirect relationships among the variables to provide a more complex analysis of
the causal process.

Figure 5.1
Causal Model
Expected Paths
Percent Change
National Product

Presidential Campaign
Activity

State Level
Presidential Vote

r
National
Unemployment

Quality
Challenger

State Level Party
Advantage
State Level
Senate Vote

Senate Challenger
Campaign
Senate Incumbent
Campaign
Seat Type
Marginality

Figure 5.2 presents the standardized coefficients of the causal model
displaying the magnitudes of the paths suggested before. Specifically, as shown
in Figure 5.2, this modeling process generated 16 separate regression equations
to capture both the direct and indirect effects on the variables. Turning to the
paths, the results suggest that the Presidential State Level Vote was influenced
by Unemployment, the Percent Change in National Product, Partisanship, and
the Senate State Level Vote. The Presidential Campaign Activity showed
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significance only at the .06 level. Challenger Party Presidential Campaign
Activity was directly related to the activities of the Incumbent Party Presidential
Campaign Activity, with a correlation of .803. This finding was consistent with the

prior work of Shaw (1999b). His study focused on a variety of effects affect
presidential messages. More importantly, he demonstrates how the presidential
challenger reacts to those campaign related events and messages to shape and
mobilize his own support. It also follows that both competing presidential
candidates tend to concentrate their resources in the same states. Based on this
information, the variable was modified for the causal model to reflect the
difference in campaign intensity.
The causal model provides support that campaigns do matter and Senate
campaigns can affect the presidential vote. While Campbell’s (1992, 2000)
argument that macro-level factors are important proves true under this analysis,
this causal model also demonstrates the relevance of campaigns.
Unemployment has a direct effect on Challenger Party Senate Campaign
Intensity as expected, but failed to demonstrate statistical significance directly

with Quality Challenger. This suggests that consistent with the literature, macro
level variables have an effect on the ability of a challenger to effectively
challenge the incumbent. As discussed in chapter four, Quality Challenger was
coded as 1 for an incumbent party challenger with previous experience, -1 for a
challenger party with previous experience and was coded with 0 if neither
candidate had experience or if both candidates had experience. As suggested in
earlier chapters, this variable was not performing as expected and may be one
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Figure 5.2
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explanation as to why the direct effect was not captured. Another presidential
campaign variable should be developed for additional work. Still, the results from
the macro level variable of Unemployment on the Presidential State Level Vote
and Challenger Party Senate Campaign Intensity supports the work of Holbrook
and Campbell. However, more important for this research is these results
support the work of Jacobsen and Kernall (1981) who suggest that these
variables work to benefit strategic politicians. That is, they serve as the backdrop
to help determine if a specific campaign will have a quality challenger who can
mount the financial resources to challenge an incumbent. Additionally,
considering both indirect and direct effects, this model supports the research of
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Jacobsen (1987) that suggests Senate incumbent spending is directly related to
challenger spending. This had a significance level of ,000. The standardized
coefficient was .450, which indicates that this is a strong predictor.
The Senate State Level Vote seems to be directly affected by Seat Type^\
Marginality, Senate Campaign Intensity, Challenger Quality and Partisanship.

The Seat Type was strong with a beta weight of .514. That is, Incumbency
exerts strong substantive effects on the Senate State Level Vote. Interestingly,
the Partisanship variable had a stronger effect on the Presidential State level
vote than on the Senate State Level Vote. The effect of Partisanship on the

presidential vote was .297, while the effect of Partisanship on the Senate vote
was .153. Table 5.9 provides the results of the estimates used to generate the
causal analysis.
Consistent with the results presented in Figure 5.2, these effects suggest
that macro level variables and campaign activity affect both the state level vote
for president and Senate.^^ More importantly, the path analysis suggests that the
campaign activities at one level can no longer be considered in isolation. In
summary, the above has presented the statistical analysis used to examine this
thesis’ main concern: under what conditions do Senate elections affect the state
level vote for the presidency?

21

Seat type variable was included in the causal model to capture the White House Incumbent
party Senate Incumbency advantage.
The Senate State Level Vote demonstrated statistical significance when the Senate Campaign
Intensity variables were included and when they were excluded. Conversely, the Senate
Campaign Intensity variables demonstrated statistical significance only when the State Level
Senate Vote was not included. (Incumbent Party Senate Campaign Intensity significance level
was reduced to of .07)
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Table 5.9

Causal Analyses Results

Senate State Level Vote - Incumbent Party
Senate Campaign - IP

beta
.237

Senate Campaign - CP

-.193

Marginality

.121

Seat Type

.514

Quality Challenger

.200

Partisanship

153

Presidential State Level Vote - Incumbent Party
National Product

.559

Presidential Campaign Activity

.095

Unemployment

-.284

Partisanship

.297

Senate State Level Vote

.193

Senate Campaign Intensity - Incumbent Party
Senate Campaign Intensity - CP

.450

Quality Challenger

253

Senate Campaign Intensity - Challenger Party
Unemployment

-.167

t
3.422

Sig.
.000

-2.874

.002

1.867

.032

6.128

.000

6.081

.000

3.044

.003

8.696

.000

1.527

.06

4.425

.000

4.283

.000

2.935

.002

.434
(.075)
.778
(.238)

5.824

.000

3.268

.001

-.268
(.140)

-1.921

.027

b
.015
(.004)
-.012
(.004)
.022
(.012)
.072
(.012)
.039
(.014)
121
(.046)
11.791
(1.356)
-.464
(.304)
-1.944
(.439)
16.296
(3.805)
13.417
(4.571)

After presenting the results of the naive models that do not consider
spillover campaign effects, the analysis moved to an assessment of the spillover
effects between the Senate and presidential campaigns. It is the spillover
models that provide the best evidence for the thesis’ main contention.
Specifically, the presidential model was significantly improved with the inclusion
of the Senate Campaign Intensity suggesting that activity at one level may
benefit up ticket races. The chapter concluded by presenting the causal analysis
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that seeks to examine if the competitiveness of the Senate race, measured in
terms of the vote... positively affects the state level vote for the presidency. The
conclusion of this analysis is that the Senate vote influences the vote for
President through campaigns and competitive elections.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters explore the inter-relationship between the state
level Senate and presidential campaigns. The specific hypothesis questioned
whether competitive Senate elections with a high level of campaign intensity
provide a positive affect for the presidential candidate in the same political party.
To answer this question, this thesis developed theoretical models that accounts
for spillover effects among campaigns at different levels.
The initial naive models provided a baseline from which to compare the
spillover models. That is, this thesis considered the impact in terms of each
election in isolation. From there, each election was considered in terms of being
affected or having spillover effects from other campaigns. By then creating a
causal model, this research was able to provide a clearer picture of the causal
process of interest. As such, these findings serve to illustrate the
interdependence of local, national, and macro-level variables that impact
elections.
The results presented here suggest that presidential and Senate elections
are influenced by macro level factors as well as the campaign events. This
supports the work of Campbell (2000) and Holbrook (1991) who suggest macro
level factors are important. However, in slight contrast to Campbell, who
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suggests that campaigns are not significant, this study suggests that campaigns
can matter. For example, in the causal model where all variables were
standardized. Partisanship showed a beta weight of .153 on the Senate State
Level Vote, while Senate Incumbent Campaign Intensity performed at .237. This

shows the effect of campaign activity may be stronger than Partisanship.
Campaign effects could be more important because they are changeable. For
example, it would be easier to increase campaign activity or target a high
performing precinct than it would be to change a macro level variable such as the
national unemployment rate. However, this being said, a change in campaign
tactics would be effective only when the macro level variables supported a
competitive election and the emergence of a quality challenger.
Both the macro level variables of Unemployment and the Percent Change
in National Product had direct effects on the Presidential State Level Vote.

In

addition. Unemployment had a direct effect on the Senate Challenger Campaign
activity.

This multi-level affects of the economic macro level variables on both

the Senate and presidential variables underscores the importance of analyzing
all of the various effects that each variable may have on another. This study
further suggests that macro level and campaign effects cannot be evaluated in
isolation from one another. This research confirms prior work such as Jacobsen
(2000), who emphasizes the importance of considering various interactions
between national factors and campaign activity.
As mentioned earlier, there is considerable research that suggests that
campaigns matter (Kahn and Kenny, 1999; Shaw, 1999b; Westlye, 1983;
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Holbrook, 1994; Damore, 2004). This same research highlights the importance
of campaigns, specifically when there is a quality challenger in a competitive
election. The results presented suggest that a quality challenger is central to a
competitive election. This study has found support for Jacobsen and Kernall’s
(1981 ) research on the impact and importance of quality challengers. Quality
Challengers were shown to have a strong, direct effect on Senate Incumbent
Campaign Intensity and the Senate State Level Vote. Additionally, Marginality

had a direct effect on Senate State Level Vote. This supports Stewart’s (1989)
research regarding the importance of the relationship between marginality and
quality challengers.
Competitive Senate elections with well-financed quality challengers
appear to have a direct impact on the Presidential State Level Vote. The Senate
State Level Vote has a direct effect on the Presidential State Level Vote.
Incumbency proved to be significant in almost every case, supporting the prior

research of Campbell and Sumners (1990) and Calvert & Ferejohn (1983).
In addition to incumbency, the factor of money in campaigns still seems to
be a highly consistent indicator of competitive elections. The amount of money
necessary to engage the media and the voting public remains significant. The
measure of 2:1 utilized in this study and by Westlye (1991, 1993) proves to be a
reliable indicator. Campaign spending and the spending by political parties can
influence the competitiveness of a campaign. The increase and amount of
money being spent in a political environment increases the likelihood the voting
public will be engaged in the contest (Nicholson, 2003).
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The results of this research provide an initial insight into the multi-level
nature of the campaign process, but would need to be refined to include a more
precise measure of Presidential Campaign Activity and Partisanship. While most
results were consistent with theoretical expectations, there were limitations with
the data that did not allow a more detailed analysis of presidential campaign
activity. Due to data limitations of the Presidential Campaign Activity variable,
this study was not able to capture whether or not there was a direct coattail
relationship from the presidency to the Senate (although prior presidential coattail
studies support that claim). As mentioned before, having a presidential
campaign variable that can accurately assess the financial expenditures on a
state-by-state basis may help to answer the question more thoroughly.
Another limitation of this study is the sample size. Although this thesis
initially planned to utilize every Senate election from 1976-2000 (as discussed in
chapter four), the information prior to the 1990s is not readily accessible. With
the conclusion of the 2004 election cycle, the next step in this research process
would be to include those samples in the case study to test consistency.
This study can be applied to practical uses and understanding. Based on
the results, Senate candidates may have a clearer understanding as to when the
right time would be to run for elected office. It is important to recognize the
challenges facing those running for election. The guidelines for political parties to
select viable candidates may be better identified. This could assist in putting
limited resources to better use. Lastly, nominees and presidential candidates
may pay closer attention to Senate elections in states that are swing or open for
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the next presidential election. If Senate elections can affect the presidency, as
this study suggests, then it would be important for national committees not to limit
their scope of resources to national elections for president.
The purpose of this research is to provide an advancement of our
understanding into the factors that influence the vote for president. The
dynamics of local considerations cannot be minimized. That is, election studies
need to take into account the bigger picture in the election process.

The results

presented here suggest there is empirical support for a relationship that only has
been mentioned slightly in previous research and dismissed.
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